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We investigate the relationship between inequality and education funding in
a model of probabilistic voting over public education spending where the private
option is available. A change in inequality can have opposite e⁄ects at di⁄erent
income levels: higher inequality decreases public spending per student and increases
enrollment in public schools in poor economies, while the opposite holds in the rich
ones. A change in the tax base can also have non-monotonic e⁄ects. We also
study the implications of di⁄erent voting participation across income groups. The
predictions of the model are supported by U.S. school district-level data.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and the deter-
mination of education funding. The worldwide surge in income inequality in the last
decades, the importance of human capital for individual and national prosperity as well
as the rising pressures on public budgets make this a critical issue. However, the litera-
ture studying the e⁄ects of inequality on public education spending (and, more generally,
on public goods provision and income redistribution) has yet to reach a consensus. For
example, Lindert (1996) ￿nds a negative relationship between inequality and public edu-
cation spending in a sample of OECD countries. Using U.S. state level data, de la Croix
and Doepke (2009) ￿nd that higher inequality is positively associated with public spend-
ing per student and negatively correlated with public spending per capita. Corcoran and
Evans (2009) ￿nd that rising inequality within U.S. school districts is associated with
higher local revenues per pupil.
Given these inconclusive results, in this paper we investigate the issue further. In the
theoretical part, we provide a model that reconciles the ￿ndings of the previous literature,
by showing that, in fact, the relationship of inequality and public school funding can be
non-monotonic, i.e. negative at low levels of income and positive otherwise. We consider
a political economy model of public education provision with a private schooling option
and endogenous fertility decisions, similar to de la Croix and Doepke (2009). Building
on this framework, we model household income heterogeneity to be consistent with the
skewness of empirical income distributions, where the median is lower than the mean
income.
If education is a normal good, the desired education quality increases with income.
Tax ￿nanced uniform public education quality is insu¢ cient for the rich parents who
choose to send their children to a private school. Ceteris paribus, the higher the public
school quality, the lower the private enrollment share. The availability of a private choice
generates an endogenous income threshold that separates public and private school users.
Moreover, in our model, fertility is connected to the school choice, with the private school
users choosing a lower fertility rate than the households that opt for public schooling.
For transparency, the fertility is constant within the two groups.
The equilibrium public spending arises as the politically mediated balance between
the con￿ icting interests of these two groups. On the one hand, those opting for private
schooling want to minimize the tax burden. On the other hand, those who choose public
schooling, want to ensure adequate spending per student.
To see how the shape and the location of the income distribution a⁄ect this political
balance, consider, for example, an exogenous mean preserving spread. First, this produces
a shape e⁄ect: it decreases the size of the middle class, adding (asymmetrically) mass to
the tails of the distribution.
2The initial position of the income threshold relative to the tails is critical in determin-
ing how the relative size of the two groups responds to an increase in inequality: if the
threshold is initially located su¢ ciently far in the right tail, the share of private school
users goes up with higher income dispersion. As mentioned above, the location of the
income threshold is driven by the relative quality of public education. While this depends
on the equilibrium tax rate and public school enrollment, it also depends on the tax base
in the economy, which in our model is proportional to the average income.
Second, as equilibrium policies change, households adjust their education choices.
Thus, the mean preserving spread leads to a shift in the critical income level, inducing an
additional threshold e⁄ect. The direction and magnitude of this shift also depend on the
relative quality of public education and hence on the average income. Together with the
shape e⁄ect, the movement of the threshold in response to higher inequality determine
the overall change in the political support for public spending.
We study how the interplay of these two e⁄ects determines the equilibrium education
spending and enrollment in two counterfactual experiments: a) an increase in the tax
base keeping income dispersion constant and b) a mean preserving spread of the income
distribution. Our analysis yields two main ￿ndings.
First, generalizing results in the previous literature, we show that the relationship
between inequality and public spending per student can be non-monotonic, depending
on the average income level in the economy. A mean preserving spread decreases public
spending per student but increases tax rates (spending per capita) and public school
enrollments in low income economies, while it has opposite e⁄ects at high income levels.
Furthermore, a marginal increase in the tax base, holding income dispersion constant,
can also have non-monotonic e⁄ects.
Second, both the tax base and inequality e⁄ects on redistribution depend critically,
not only on the level of the average income per capita, but also on the parental preferences
for quality versus quantity of children. The non-monotonic relationships described above
obtain only when the utility weight of the number of children is moderate. When the
concern for the number of children is high, an increase in income dispersion lowers the
public spending per student, despite higher taxation, while an increase in the tax base
generates opposite e⁄ects. In contrast, when concern for the quantity of children is low,
higher inequality decreases taxation but, as enrollment in public schools falls, spending
per student increases.
As explained above, if the private option is available, the relative quality of public
education determines the response of the economy to changes in the income distribution.
Given some tax rate, the quality of public education depends on the average income (or
the tax base) and the number of children enrolled in public schools, which is determined
by parental preferences for fertility.
In order to get more intuition of the mechanisms in place, consider the case when
3fertility is low or the tax base is high. As the quality of public education is high, only
the rich households use private schools. A mean preserving spread increases support for
private education as some of the middle class is replaced with high income households,
which prefer this option (the shape e⁄ect). This replacement also increases spending
per student in public schools as resources are spread over fewer children. On the other
hand, some middle income households are replaced by poorer families (again, the shape
e⁄ect). However, since both household types choose public schooling and hence have
identical fertility rates in our model, this replacement neither generates extra support
for the public option nor does it decrease its quality. Therefore, marginal households
strictly prefer public education, i.e. the indi⁄erence income threshold moves to the right
of the income distribution (the threshold e⁄ect). Nonetheless, since the income threshold
is relatively far in the right tail, its e⁄ect is dominated in magnitude by the shape e⁄ect.
Thus, a mean preserving spread increases the support for private education and lowers
taxes. While both public school enrollment and the tax rate decrease, more resources are
available per student.
In contrast, when fertility rates are high or the tax base is low, public schools are of low
quality, so both rich and some middle income households use private schools. A mean
preserving spread increases support for public education as it replaces middle income
households, that opt for private schools, with low income families, which prefer the free
alternative (the shape e⁄ect). These families also choose high fertility rates, which further
reduces (expected) spending per student. While this generates an endogenous shift of the
marginal households into private schools (the threshold e⁄ect), the shape e⁄ect dominates
in equilibrium, leading to higher enrollment in public schools and higher taxes, despite
lower spending per student.
As a benchmark, we focus on probabilistic voting with households that have uniform
political power. Asymmetric distribution of political power is typically associated with
authoritarian regimes or partially democratic countries. However, it can also occur in
well established democracies if, for example, voter turnout varies systematically with
demographic characteristics. Indeed, the literature on political participation in the United
States documents large turnout di⁄erences across income and age groups in national, state
as well as local elections. While previous evidence applies to political participation in
general, we show that education related votes are subject to similar disparities. Using
data on school budget votes across school districts in the state of New York, we ￿nd
a positive and signi￿cant correlation between socioeconomic indicators and involvement
in local politics related to public education provision. Motivated by these ￿ndings, we
then extend the model to include an income based index of political power and study its
properties.1
1Other papers that study asymmetrically distributed political power include Gans and Smart (1996),
BØnabou (2000), de la Croix and Doepke (2009).
4In the empirical part, we test predictions arising from the theory using U.S. school
district level data. We investigate the e⁄ects of the tax base and the income inequality
on three schooling measures: the local public spending per student, the share of private
enrollment and the local public spending per capita. The per capita spending can be in-
terpreted as a measure of redistribution through education spending. We show that the
aggregate relationship between spending and inequality reveals signi￿cant heterogeneities
once the sample is split into quantiles of district average income. To deal with reverse
causality, we use 1990 Census data to create a synthetic income distribution that cap-
tures residual inequality due to broader trends in economic activity that have shifted the
aggregate income distribution and which individual school districts are too small to alter.
We then use its mean and standard deviation to instrument the corresponding moments
of the 2000 income distribution.
Both the least squares and the instrumental variables estimates lend strong support to
predictions derived from the theoretical model with respect to enrollment and spending
per student in public schools. Allowing for moderate asymmetries in the distribution of
political power, in line with U.S. stylized facts, helps explain the behavior of per capita
spending in both poor and rich school districts.
There is a large body of work studying the e⁄ects of inequality on public goods pro-
vision and income redistribution. However, as mentioned above, on both the theoretical
and the empirical front, the literature has often reached inconsistent, even contradic-
tory results. While some political economy papers argue that higher inequality leads to
more redistribution through higher taxation (Meltzer and Richard (1981), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), BØnabou (1997)), others ￿nd that more unequal or more heterogenous
societies spend less on public goods (Soares (1998), de la Croix and Doepke (2009)).
Glomm (2004) ￿nds that the relationship between inequality and the amount of redistri-
bution through public education services depends on the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and the quality of education in the parent￿ s utility. He ￿nds that for em-
pirically relevant value of this parameter, higher inequality generates less redistribution.
On the empirical side, a number of papers have found that support for redistribution
and public goods provision is weaker in more unequal or more heterogenous societies
(Goldin and Katz (1997), Alesina et al. (1999, 2001), Luttmer (2001)). Perotti (1996)
￿nds no relationship between inequality and redistribution in democracies. Using data
from the U.S. General Social Survey, Lind (2007) ￿nds that inequality between di⁄er-
ent groups reduces redistribution, while within group inequality increases it. A more
recent paper by Boustan et al. (2010) ￿nds that rising inequality in cities and districts is
associated with higher local revenue collection and expenditures.
Our paper contributes to the debate by providing more general theoretical results
borne out in the data. BØnabou (1997, 2000) and Lee and Roemer (1998) focus on
capital market imperfections to show that non-monotonic responses of redistribution to
5inequality are possible. Fernandez and Levy (2008) also ￿nd a non-monotonic e⁄ect of
increased diversity in a model with income and preference heterogeneity. Complemen-
tary to these studies, we obtain a non-monotonic e⁄ect of inequality on redistribution at
di⁄erent levels of the average income per capita stemming from endogenous fertility and
education choices. Also, in these papers, redistribution occurs through progressive tax-
ation (BØnabou (2000)) or the provision of universal public education (Lee and Roemer
(1998)). In the latter case, private and public investments in education are complements,
but only the rich households top up.
In contrast, we focus on public education funding when a private alternative is avail-
able. In addition to modeling private schools, the framework presented here features
endogenous fertility and education related tax deductions, re￿ ecting important features
in the organization of primary and secondary education in the United States. Another
advantage of explicit opting out is that the endogenous threshold in education choices
has a clear empirical counterpart as enrollments in public and private schools are easily
observable. This facilitates testing the model￿ s conclusions in more dimensions: spending
per student, enrollments as well as per capita spending.
While our analysis builds on de la Croix and Doepke (2009), there are some important
di⁄erences. On the one hand, a more ￿ exible parametrization of the income distribution
allow us to recover their results as a particular case. On the other hand, they use U.S.
state level data to document correlations between inequality and education spending
whereas we focus on school district data. Besides analyzing the e⁄ects of inequality
on education provision, we shed light on the separate e⁄ects stemming from the tax
base. As a distinct theoretical contribution, we parsimoniously embed in our framework
a continuous measure of political power as a function of income, that preserves, under
reasonable conditions, the uniqueness of the political equilibrium. Finally, we emphasize
the interaction between parental preferences and the tax base in generating di⁄erent
responses of redistribution to inequality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 de￿nes the equilibrium and derives the main analytical results. Section 4
documents signi￿cant participation di⁄erences in local politics related to public education
provision and extends the benchmark model to analyze political power. Section 5 is
devoted to the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix
A. Appendix B provides the data sources and summary statistics of the variables used in
the empirical part. Appendix C details the construction of the instruments used in the
estimations. Appendix D includes simulation results of the model￿ s comparative statics.
62 The Model
The economy is populated by a large number of households, which are heterogenous
in income. The mass of households is normalized to one. Each household consists of
an adult and a number of children. Children can get educated either in public schools,
which are ￿nanced by tax revenues, or in private schools, ￿nanced by parental spending.
This framework is similar to de la Croix and Doepke (2009). However, while they focus
on a uniform distribution with mean one and standard deviation ￿; here the household
income is distributed according to a Pareto distribution, with p.d.f. f and c.d.f. F,
with parameters yl > 0 and ￿ > 2; and support y 2 [yl;1):2 The mean and standard











Adults derive utility from household consumption c, the number of children n and the
quality of their education E, which can be private or public. Let q denote the quality
of public schools. Households can opt out of publicly provided education and send their
children to a private school of quality er. The preferences are given by:
u(c;n;E) = ln(c) + ￿ [ln(n) + ￿ln(E)]; (2)
where E = q;er, ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1). Besides providing tractability, the assumption of
logarithmic utility is consistent with the empirical evidence, which suggests that income
and substitution elasticities of education spending have similar magnitudes (see Gradstein
et al. (2005), pg. 50-51 for a discussion).
The government taxes the income from all households at the constant rate ￿: Tax
revenues are used to ￿nance public education of uniform quality for all children. For
simplicity, we assume that quality of schooling is equal to the spending per student. The
public policy is determined through a probabilistic voting mechanism described below.
2.1 Household￿ s problem
The education expenditures are assumed to be tax deductible. As we will see further,
this implies that the decisions regarding the quantity and quality of children are not
a⁄ected by taxation. This assumption together with the endogenous fertility generates a
constant tax base in equilibrium, which does not depend on the aggregate enrollment in
public education.3 Together with the explicit possibility to opt out of public education,
2The p.d.f. is given by f(y) = ￿y￿
l =y￿+1; for y > yl and zero otherwise. The c.d.f. is F(y) =
1 ￿ (yl=y)
￿ : The Pareto distribution is used for tractability reasons. Other distributions used in the
literature, such as the log-normal, yield similar results.
3See also de la Croix and Doepke (2009).
7deductibility of education expenditures is in keeping with our focus on the U.S. case.
Rearing children involves a time cost. Denote by ￿ 2 (0;1) the fraction of the parent￿ s
time spent raising a child. Given the quality of publicly provided education q and the
tax rate ￿, the household with income y solves the following problem:
max
fc￿0;n￿0;E￿0g




c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y(1 ￿ ￿n); if public education
c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[y(1 ￿ ￿n) ￿ ner]; if private education.
Denote with V p and V r the utility of households whose children are educated in the
public and private schools, respectively. A household with income y that chooses public




p(y;n;q) = ln[(1 ￿ ￿)y(1 ￿ ￿n)] + ￿ ln(n) + ￿￿ln(q); (4)
The solution of problem (4) is np = ￿=[￿(1 + ￿)]:




r(y;n;e) = lnf(1 ￿ ￿)[y(1 ￿ ￿n) ￿ ne]g + ￿ ln(n) + ￿￿ln(e
r): (5)
The solutions to the problem (5) are nr = [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]=[￿(1 + ￿)] and er = ￿￿y=(1￿￿):
Comparing np and nr we see that households that choose private schooling have a lower
fertility than those sending the children to public schools.
Substituting np in (4) and nr and er in (5) we obtain the indirect utilities of households































A household will choose public education if and only if V p(y;q) ￿ V r(y;q): This




; where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
1
￿￿1 2 (0;1): (8)
Households choose the school type taking the other households￿decisions as given.
Denote by ￿ the fraction of households that choose public schooling. In equilibrium, the
individual choices must be consistent with the aggregate outcome, that is, the number of
households with income lower than the threshold e y should be equal to ￿: The consistency
8condition is:
￿(q) = F(e y(q)) =
Z e y(q)
yl






Notice that ￿(q) is not equal to the fraction of children that go to public schools since




np￿(q) + nr(1 ￿ ￿(q))
: (10)
Substituting the expressions for np and nr we obtain:
N(q) =
￿(q)
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(q)
> ￿(q): (11)
2.2 Government budget constraint















where the left-hand side is the total public education spending, and the right-hand side
the collected tax revenues from the two types of households (public and private school
users, respectively). Using the expressions for np; nr and er in the right-hand side of (12),
we can see that the fraction of income that is taxable is constant across income groups
and is equal to y=(1+￿): As a result, the total tax base is constant and does not depend
on the fraction of households choosing private schooling. Consequently, the right-hand
side of the government budget constraint becomes ￿￿=(1 + ￿). Using the expression for
np in the left-hand side, we can express the quality of public schooling as a function of







yl yf(y)dy is the average income and also the tax base.
2.3 Voting on public education funding
Fertility and education choices are made before voting takes place but in equilib-
rium, agents have perfect foresight regarding its outcome. This timing re￿ ects sizeable
di⁄erences in the relative costs and time horizons of the decisions involved. While pub-
lic education spending is usually decided through yearly budget votes, fertility decisions
9cannot be easily adjusted at this frequency and depend largely on "pre-determined" char-
acteristics, such as income, education level, race, religion, etc. A similar argument applies
to the choice between public and private schooling, which in the U.S. is tightly connected
to residential choice and therefore can entail substantial switching costs.
The public policies are determined through probabilistic voting. The voting problem is
unidimensional, i.e. once the tax rate is chosen, the spending per student q is determined
from (13). Consider a set-up with two political parties, each proposing a program. Voters
care about the education policy proposed but also about a second dimension of the
electoral platform, called "ideology". The probability that an individual votes for a party
thus depends on her ideological bias toward the party￿ s proposed platform. The results
of the elections are a random event, each party having a probability of winning.
The ideological preferences are assumed to be orthogonal to those on public policy.
Thus, the probability that a person votes for a certain party (and the party vote share)
is a smooth function of the distance between the two platforms. This framework has a
unique equilibrium in which both parties converge to the same platform (see Persson and











subject to the government budget constraint (13).
The ￿rst and second terms of the welfare function are the aggregate utilities of the
households that choose public and private education, respectively. The term p(y) captures
the political power of the group. We ￿rst assume p(y) = 1, that is, all voters have the
same political power. Later, we relax this assumption.
Note that the income threshold e y is taken as given in the maximization, in keeping
with the assumption of that fertility and education choices are predetermined when the
vote takes place. While making the analysis more tractable, this assumption is still
consistent, in equilibrium, with perfect foresight: the expected and the actual shares of
households that choose public schooling are equal.4

























Since only the ￿rst and the third term are functions of the policy variables, the welfare
4Nechyba (1999) takes a somewhat similar approach in a multi-community model where public edu-
cation spending is decided by majority voting.
10can be rewritten as
W(￿) = ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿ln(q(￿)); (15)
where ￿(e y) is taken as given. Substituting q from (13) and taking the ￿rst order condition





Everything else equal, the tax increases with the households￿concern for children as
well as with the enrollment. In the next section we de￿ne the equilibrium and study its
properties.
3 Equilibrium analysis
De￿nition 1. A politico-economic equilibrium is an income threshold e y; an allocation
(cp;np) if y ￿ e y, (cr;nr;er) if y > e y; and a public policy (q;￿) such that:
(i) household￿ s decisions solve problems (4) or (5), given public policy (q;￿);
(ii) the government budget is balanced, i.e. it satis￿es (13);
(iii) the tax rate ￿ solves the social welfare maximization problem (14);
(iv) the consistency condition (9) is satis￿ed.
Next, we solve for the equilibrium threshold e y: To minimize clutter, we drop functional





1 + ￿￿￿(e y)
: (17)












Proposition 1. There exist a unique and interior equilibrium income threshold e y￿ 2
(yl;1) that solves equation (18) (proof in the Appendix).
Note that the equilibrium threshold e y￿ is always interior because the support of the
income distribution does not have an upper bound. However, when e y￿ ! 1; the fraction
of students in public schools goes asymptotically to 1.
Proposition 1 implies there is a unique equilibrium public spending per student:
q
























(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿; where ￿






In the following, we investigate how changes in the income distribution of a school
district a⁄ect the main policy variables. We focus on two experiments: a) a change in
the average income per capita, ￿, keeping the standard deviation, ￿, constant and b) a
mean preserving spread in the income distribution.
3.1 A change in the mean income (tax base)
Now we analyze the e⁄ects of changing the mean income, ￿, on the equilibrium public
spending per student q, the tax rate ￿; and enrollment in public schools N. Recall that
in our model ￿ also represents the tax base.






























[1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ f)]
2 : (23)












Studying the properties of the function @N￿=@￿ yields the following results.
Proposition 2. Let ￿ = [(2=(￿e)) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ e￿2]g and ￿ = [(1=￿) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g;
where e is the Euler constant.
1) If ￿ 6 ￿; then @N￿=@￿ > 0 and @￿￿=@￿ > 0;
2) If ￿ > ￿; then @N￿=@￿ < 0 and @￿￿=@￿ < 0;
3) If ￿ 2 (￿;￿); then there exist a unique b ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
3.1) if ￿ 2 (0;b ￿]; then @N￿=@￿ 6 0 and @￿￿=@￿ 6 0;
123.2) if ￿ 2 (b ￿;1); then @N￿=@￿ > 0 and @￿￿=@￿ > 0;
(Proof in the Appendix).
The next proposition establishes su¢ cient conditions under which the equilibrium
spending per student q￿ varies positively with the mean income.
Corollary 1. 1) If ￿ > ￿; then @q￿=@￿ > 0;
2) If ￿ 2 (￿;￿) there exists e ￿ > b ￿ such that @q￿=@￿ > 0 on the interval ￿ 2 (0;e ￿)
(Proof in the Appendix).
Figure 1: An increase in the tax base (mean income per capita), indicated by dot vari-
ables (e.g. ￿￿ > ￿) and solid lines. Panel a: high fertility preference (￿) or low tax base
(￿). Panel b: low fertility preference or high tax base. The arrow indicates the endoge-
nous change in the indi⁄erence threshold. Dark (light) shaded areas represent increases
(decreases) in the support for private education.
As it is apparent from Proposition 2, the e⁄ects of an increase in the tax base depend
on ￿. Equilibrium fertility allocations npand nr are increasing functions of ￿, while private
education spending er does not depend on ￿:5 We therefore interpret ￿ as a relative weight
of fertility in the parental preferences.
Everything else equal, a marginal increase in the tax base keeping dispersion constant
has two e⁄ects. First, it adds relatively more rich and middle income households, so
that, as yl increases, the right tail becomes thicker. The increase in the mass of relatively
richer households has a positive e⁄ect on the demand for private education. Call this
(exogenous) shape e⁄ect. Second, it increases the resources available for public education.
This makes the households that were previously indi⁄erent between private and public
education to always choose the latter. Call this (endogenous) threshold e⁄ect. The two
movements have opposing e⁄ects on the tax rate and equilibrium enrollment. Which
5As ￿ increases, parents prefer fertility (￿) over quality (￿￿) since since ￿ < 1:
13e⁄ect dominates depends on the quality of public education, de￿ned as spending per
student, relative to the private option.
Public education quality is low when few resources are available (low ￿) or when there
are many children enrolled (high ￿, i.e. high fertility), corresponding to case 2 and 3.1 in
Proposition 2 . Panel a in ￿gure 1 depicts this case. This implies a relatively large mass of
rich households in the right tail choosing, in equilibrium, private education. An increase
in ￿ further increases this mass, generating a large increase in the support for private
education (the shape e⁄ect). It dominates the higher enrollment in public education by
some middle income families caused by the threshold e⁄ect. Therefore the equilibrium
tax and public enrollment decrease. However, the equilibrium spending per student can
increase as the withdrawal of rich households from public education frees some resources.
Panel b in ￿gure 1 shows the case when the tax base (￿) is high or fertility prefer-
ence (￿) is low (regimes 1 and 3.2 in Proposition 2). In this case, the public education
resources are high, so only the very rich households prefer private education. Thus, when
the tax base increases, the shape e⁄ect generates a more modest boost of demand for
private education than in the case above. Again, the threshold e⁄ect implies borderline
households choose public education when average income increases marginally. However,
the threshold e⁄ect dominates the shape e⁄ect in this case. Increased support for public
education generates higher enrollment and taxes. Nonetheless, equilibrium spending per
student can decrease if the increase in enrollment outpaces that in revenues.
3.2 A mean preserving spread
Next, we analyze the relationship between public policies and inequality - proxied
by ￿, the standard deviation of the income distribution. We perform a mean-preserving
spread and study its implications on public spending per student, q; the tax rate, ￿; and




























From the expressions above we see that spending per student varies inversely with
public enrollment and the tax rate. Next, we study the properties of functions @q￿=@￿;
@N￿=@￿; and @￿￿=@￿. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Let ￿ = [(2=(￿e)) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ e￿2]g and ￿ = [(1=￿) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g;
14where e is the Euler constant.
1) If ￿ 6 ￿; then @￿￿=@￿ < 0; @N￿=@￿ < 0; @q￿=@￿ > 0;
2) If ￿ > ￿; then @￿￿=@￿ > 0; @N￿=@￿ > 0; @q￿=@￿ < 0;
3) If ￿ 2 (￿;￿); then there exist a unique b ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
3.1) if ￿ 2 (0;b ￿]; then @￿￿=@￿ > 0; @N￿=@￿ > 0; @q￿=@￿ 6 0;
3.2) if ￿ 2 (b ￿;1); then @￿￿=@￿ < 0; @N￿=@￿ < 0; @q￿=@￿ > 0;
(Proof in the Appendix).
The intuition of these results is the following. A mean preserving spread decreases the
size of the middle class, adding mass to the tails of the income distribution (poor and rich
households). This is the shape e⁄ect. Whether support for public education increases or
not following this change in the shape of the distribution depends on the initial location
of the indi⁄erence threshold. Thus, the endogenous response of this threshold to higher
inequality generates an additional e⁄ect.
Figure 2: A mean preserving spread, indicated by dot variables (e.g. ￿￿ > ￿) and solid
lines. Panel a: high fertility preference (￿) or low tax base (￿). Panel b: low fertility
preference or high tax base. The arrow indicates the endogenous change in the indi⁄erence
threshold. Dark (light) shaded areas represent increases (decreases) in the support for
private education.
Again, consider the case of low public education quality (low ￿ or high ￿), correspond-
ing to cases 2 and 3.1 in Proposition 3, and shown in panel a of ￿gure 2. This implies
that many rich and middle income households choose the private option. Thus, the in-
di⁄erence threshold lies relatively far from the right tail, in some middle income range.
First, there are two opposing shape e⁄ects that arise under a mean preserving spread.
On the one hand, the middle class shrinks and so does the support for private education.
On the other hand, the mean preserving spread increases the mass of rich households in
the right tail who send their children to private education. The overall e⁄ect on demand
for public education thus depends on the relative magnitude of these opposing e⁄ects.
15Second, when public education is of low quality, an increase in inequality prompts the
threshold households to switch to private education, as the mean preserving spread adds
more poor, high fertility households in the left tail, which further reduce spending per
student. This is the threshold e⁄ect. In this case, the negative e⁄ect on the demand for
private education caused by the reduction of middle class dominates the positive e⁄ects
stemming from the extra mass of rich households as well as the endogenous shift in the
income threshold towards private schooling. As a result, the enrollment in public schools
goes up and so does the tax rate. Despite the increase in revenues (and the extra resources
made available by households who left public schools), spending per student is lower in
equilibrium as middle income households (choosing lower fertility and private schooling)
have been replaced by low income and high fertility households that bene￿t from public
education.
Conversely, when the tax base (￿) is large or fertility preference (￿) is low, such as in
cases 1 and 3.2 in Proposition 3 (panel b of ￿gure 2), the resources for public schooling
are higher and, compared with the case above, the mass of middle income households
that prefer private education is lower. Thus, the negative e⁄ect on the demand for
private education generated by a reduction of middle income class is weaker and it is
likely to be dominated by the positive e⁄ect generated by an increase in the mass of
rich households (the shape e⁄ects). Second, there is again a threshold e⁄ect. In this
case, the marginal households strictly prefer public education when inequality increases.
Since the indi⁄erence threshold is far in the tail, the increase in demand for private
education from the extra mass of rich households dominates, generating a decrease in
public enrollment and the tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenues increase faster than
public school enrollment, resulting in an increase in public spending per student.
To sum up, when inequality increases, the size of the poor and rich class increases
at the expense of middle class. When the tax base is low enough, poor households steer
the political process in their favor, raising the tax rate. As the tax base is constant, this
increases the public spending per capita, or the size of redistribution. When the tax base
is high, the interests of the rich households dominate. Thus, the tax rate and the size
of redistribution go down. Interestingly, the per student spending in public education,
being driven by the endogenous response of enrollment, decreases in the ￿rst case and
increases in the second.
4 Political power
So far we have assumed each parent carries the same weight in the political process.
Next, relying on previous literature as well as new empirical evidence speci￿c to pub-
lic education politics, we document that even in a well-established democracy, like the
United States, political participation indicators, such as voter registration and turnout,
16are positively correlated with income across age and education levels. We then investigate
the e⁄ects of this bias on public education provision within the theoretical framework.
4.1 Political participation patterns across income groups
Political participation patterns across income groups in the United States have been
well documented in the literature (Verba et al. (1995), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993)). At
national level, there are striking di⁄erences. The 2000 Voter Supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS) reveals that among those in the 25-44 age group, less than
30% of those in the last income category (under $5000) voted in the 2000 presidential
elections while in the highest bracket ($75,000 and over) the turnout was of 70%. The
propensity to vote is increasing in income across all age groups. However, it is much
lower in the 18-24 age group, not exceeding 40% in the richest income bracket. Those
of age 64 and over vote in proportions ranging from around 50% to almost 90% between
in the lowest and the highest income groups. Similar patterns are revealed in the 2006
Congressional elections: 50.7% in the lowest income group (less than $10,000) registered
but only 24.3% voted, compared to 82.1% registration and 64.6% turnout in the highest
bracket ($150,000 and over).
However, in the case of the United States, despite an increasing weight of the federal
outlays, public education funding is still decided largely at state and local level. One may
assume that voters understand better, and thus are more concerned with local policies,
which they can more easily tweak in their favor. Perhaps surprisingly, a few studies
(Morlan (1984); Hajnal and Lewis (2003)) ￿nd the contrary: turnout in local elections
is on average half that of national elections, with some cities performing much worse.
These low ￿gures suggest that disadvantaged segments of the population might be even
less represented at local level. While little data is available at this level, in a recent
study of mayoral and city council elections in Californian cities, Hajnal and Lewis (2003)
￿nd that an index of socioeconomic status - summarizing income, education, poverty and
home ownership measures - is indeed a positive and highly signi￿cant correlate of voter
turnout.
In the following, we use participation rates in school budget votes across school dis-
tricts in the state of New York to document di⁄erences in political participation at school
district level. The New York State Education Department provides vote counts from
2003-2004 budget votes. In order to obtain a measure of the turnout, we divide the
number of voters to the number of adult persons in each school district. Comprehensive
demographic data at district level is only available from the 2000 Census. However, these
characteristics move slowly over time.6 We therefore use the Census numbers to compute
6Adult population counts for a representative sample of NY school districts from the 2005 American
Community Survey show a correlation of 0:99 with the 2000 ￿gures.
17voter turnout indicators. Across the 628 school districts in NY, the mean turnout is 14%,
with a maximum of 46% and a minimum of 3%. Table 1 shows least squares regressions
of the turnout variable on school district characteristics. Results con￿rm that participa-
tion in local public education politics is associated positively with household income, the
share of population with college degrees and the share of population of age 65 or superior
and negatively to the share of population living in poverty and the share of non-white
population. While these correlations describe school district aggregates, taken together
with the previous evidence on the determinants of political participation, they suggest
that income and education di⁄erences generate asymmetric propensities to vote even in
local political processes, like those related to the provision of public education.
Table 1: Voter turnout (%) in 2003-2004 school budget votes in the state of New York
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(mean income) 3.10*** 1.31 -1.59 2.70**
(4.66) (1.05) (-1.24) (2.04)
Share 65+ 0.13** 0.12** 0.06
(2.17) (2.12) (1.10)
Share college 6.41* 4.68 -0.79
(1.81) (1.44) (-0.26)




Adj. R-Squared 0.035 0.048 0.094 0.171
N 628 628 628 628
Notes: The dependent variable is the voter turnout, measured as percentage, in 2003-2004
school budget votes in the state of New York. Mean district income is expressed in dollars.
Share variables, such as the age, education and race controls are expressed in percentages.
Robust standard errors within parantheses. * indicates signi￿cance at the 10 percent level, **
indicates signi￿cance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates signi￿cance at the 1 percent level.
4.2 Political power and public education provision
We use the benchmark model to implement and study a general, yet parsimonious
political power function that assigns more clout to the rich. Next, we show that under
fairly general conditions the equilibrium continues to be unique. Finally, we analyze the
e⁄ects of uneven political representation on the public education budget, enrollment and
spending per student.
To model the direct dependence between income and political power, we de￿ne
p(y) = y
￿ (27)



























Then, using (27) and retaining the relevant terms simpli￿es the expression to
W(￿) = ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿
p ln(q): (28)
where ￿p = 1 ￿ (yl=y)
￿￿￿ :
Notice that the only di⁄erence relative to (15), the aggregate welfare in the benchmark
model, is the weight assigned to public education spending, which here is ￿p rather than
￿ = 1 ￿ (yl=y)
￿ : It is easy to see that ￿p < ￿: Thus, when political power is directly
proportional to income, the interests of the rich (lower taxes) have a higher weight in
the aggregate welfare. Since they are using mostly private education, the social welfare
function re￿ ects the new political power balance by assigning a lower weight to public
education provision.













1 + ￿￿￿p: (29)
Proposition 4. Let ￿p = (exp(￿ln(1=2) ￿ ln￿) ￿ 1)=￿: If ￿ > ￿p; there exist a unique
equilibrium income threshold e y￿ 2 (yl;1) that solves equation (29); 8￿ > 0: Moreover,
uniqueness is ensured 8￿ > 0; for su¢ ciently small ￿. (Proof in the Appendix)
In the benchmark model, higher public education enrollment translates into higher
tax revenues as the tax rate increases with the propensity for public education and the
tax base stays constant. However, now the optimal tax rate re￿ ects the taste of rich
households for private education. In the following we study how the main results in the
previous section change when we allow for political power.
We numerically replicate the exercises in Propositions 2 and 3 with and without polit-
ical power. We use ￿ = 0:075;￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 6 in the benchmark model, corresponding
to the case of intermediate fertility rates (case 3).7
Figure 3 graphs the three policy variables - public school enrollment, public spending
per capita and the tax rate - as functions of the average income per capita, keeping
7Simulation results assuming extreme preferences (case 1 and 2) are included in Appendix D.
19dispersion constant. The thin lines represent the benchmark model and the thick lines
the model with political power.









































































































Main education variables as a function of the mean income (tax base), keeping dispersion
constant, under political power (￿ = 0:3; thick line) versus benchmark (￿ = 0, thin line).
As expected, adding income correlated political weights lowers the tax rates at all
income levels. However, lower taxation determines some households to switch to private
education and thus enrollment in public schools also declines. Thus, public spending
per student declines much less than revenues. Besides these level e⁄ects, political power
induces tax rates to strictly increase with the mean income. In the benchmark model the
tax rates follow a U-shaped pattern as a function of mean income for intermediate values
of ￿.
The thin lines in ￿gure 4 display, from left to right, changes in the main variables,
for a range of mean incomes when the standard deviation of the distribution increases by
10%. Thus, in the leftmost panel, public school enrollment increases with inequality in
poor districts but declines in more unequal rich districts, as already shown in Proposition
3. Then, we allow for political power by setting ￿ = 0:3: The thick lines depict similar
changes with inequality. Rich households now have more power in setting the tax rate,
such that higher inequality leads to lower tax rates in all districts as well as more abrupt
declines in spending per student in poor districts. Case 3 in Proposition 3 shows that for
intermediate values of the altruism coe¢ cient ￿; the equilibrium tax rate increases with
inequality in poor districts, where the welfare of the relatively more numerous disadvan-
taged households depends on the quality of public schooling. This e⁄ect is overturned by
allowing richer households to enjoy political power.
We have shown that augmenting the model to include political power preserves the
uniqueness of the politico-economic equilibrium under fairly general conditions and in-
duces tax rate and public spending per student to decrease more strongly with inequality.
Moreover, the tax rate responds in a monotonic fashion to changes in inequality.



















































































































Changes in the main education variables from a 10 percent increase in income dispersion, for a
given mean income, under political power (￿ = 0:3; thick line) versus benchmark (￿ = 0, thin
line).
5 Empirical evidence
In this section we use U.S. school district level data to investigate the relationship
between household income inequality and three schooling measures: the local public
spending per student, the share of public enrollment and the local public spending per
capita (q; N and ￿; respectively, in the model). Our analysis draws on school district
(SD) demographic and ￿nancial data in 2000 from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education. Details on the data sources and
summary statistics are provided in Appendix B.
The empirical exercise is guided by the theoretical results in Section 3, where we
separated the e⁄ects of the mean income and inequality on education provision. One
important message of the analysis is that an increase in inequality can have opposing
e⁄ects in poor and rich districts. More unequal poor districts vote higher education taxes,
but have a higher share of students enrolled in public schools, so the education quality,
measured as spending per student decreases. In contrast, an increase in inequality in a
rich district generates a decrease in the tax rate, while reducing the share of enrollment
in public education which results in an increase of per student spending. Allowing for
income based political power implies that even in poor districts, an increase in inequality
can decrease the tax revenues, which further depresses spending per student.
Consequently, in line with the theory, in the empirical exercise below we allow the
e⁄ects of inequality to vary with the income level by splitting the sample of districts
by deciles of the average income per capita. Since in the model a household includes
only one parent, we use household level data to construct the empirical counterparts of
the model￿ s tax base and income dispersion. Thus, in all regressions we control for the
average household income and dispersion in the district. This allows us to contrast the
21comparative statics results of a change in mean income (Proposition 2 and Corollary
1), as well as those derived from a mean preserving spread (Proposition 3) with their
empirical counterparts.
First, we estimate for each SD the mean and the standard deviation of the house-
hold income distribution using the 16 income brackets provided in the School District
Tabulation data.8 The literature on inequality and public spending usually considers
other measures such as the Gini coe¢ cient or the mean/median ratio. However, given
the particular hypotheses we aim to test, these measures are inadequate as they do not
distinguish between changes in the mean and changes in the variance of the distribution.
We estimate the following equations:
Pub:Ed:Outcomei = ￿0 + ￿1￿i + ￿2￿i + ￿3Xi + "i
where, for district i the Pub:Ed:Outcomei includes the local spending per student, the
share of public enrollment and the local spending per capita9. ￿i and ￿i are estimates of
the ￿rst two moments of the household income distribution and Xi is a vector of control
variables described below.
To isolate the e⁄ect of local politics on education funding, we include the state and
federal revenues per student in the regression.10 State ￿xed e⁄ects remove further (un-
modelled) idiosyncractic biases. We also control for the SD type and size using a set of
eight categorical variables spanning the rural-urban axis while also accounting for size
(e.g. small town, mid-size city, large city).
Other types of heterogeneity beside income have been shown to shape public spending
decisions in systematic ways. Racial diversity is one of them (see Alesina et al. (1999),
Boustan et al. (2010)). We therefore include a Her￿ndahl index of population shares as
well as the share of non-white population to account for such biases. Another factor that
is likely to play an important role in the political support for public education is the
population age structure (see Poterba (1997), Harris et al. (2001)). Since this aspect is
not explicitly addressed in the theoretical model, we add the share of residents over the
age 65 to the set of controls. We also control for other characteristics that may alter the
spending patterns such as education attainment and share living in poverty.
Least squares estimates are shown in table 2. For brevity, we omit all the coe¢ cients
8All households are assigned an income equal to the mid-point of their bracket. The average income
of households in the last income bracket is directly available in the data. Alternative estimates that
assume, for each bracket, median income levels estimated from micro-data yield very similar results.
9In order to obtain the empirical counterpart of the model spending per capita (which is also the
tax rate), we divide local public spending by the total number of households with kids. This indicator
accounts both for the single parent assumption in the model as well as for the presence of households
without children in the data.
10Spending controls also capture other potential biases in the state level policies, such as for example
correlations induced by yardstick competition.
22associated with control variables.11 We report results for di⁄erent subsamples, de￿ned by
the average income within district. Thus, in each table, columns 1-4 refer to cumulative
subsamples ranging from the poorest 10% to the poorest 40% of the school districts.
Columns 5-8 refer to the top 40% - top 10% subsamples.
Table 2: Inequality and redistribution: LS estimation results.
Poorest Richest
Income level 10% 20% 30% 40% 40% 30% 20% 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Public spending per student
Mean Income 18.51 21.88 23.64** 28.59*** 17.92*** 15.68*** 13.46*** 7.26
(0.90) (1.62) (2.16) (2.90) (5.15) (3.98) (2.97) (1.33)
Std. Dev. -3.30 -5.81** -5.46** -7.87*** 7.44** 9.58*** 12.14*** 18.88***
(-0.79) (-2.13) (-2.38) (-3.86) (2.42) (2.59) (2.65) (3.26)
Adj. R-Squared 0.303 0.320 0.339 0.337 0.616 0.624 0.626 0.634
(B) Enrollment in public schools
Mean Income -0.46*** -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.33*** 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(-4.04) (-5.80) (-7.09) (-7.42) (0.46) (1.07) (1.27) (0.88)
Std. Dev. 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.07***
(3.55) (4.74) (5.29) (4.77) (-3.65) (-3.54) (-3.34) (-2.98)
Adj. R-Squared 0.199 0.194 0.176 0.164 0.263 0.259 0.261 0.252
(C) Public spending per capita
Mean Income 18.37 12.17 7.84 26.13* 28.41*** 24.84*** 26.18*** 25.91***
(0.54) (0.58) (0.45) (1.71) (5.77) (4.58) (4.14) (3.20)
Std. Dev. -4.30 -4.83 -2.81 -5.90* 0.38 4.72 3.39 2.29
(-0.62) (-1.06) (-0.72) (-1.78) (0.11) (1.17) (0.66) (0.32)
Adj. R-Squared 0.254 0.260 0.284 0.304 0.528 0.547 0.559 0.578
N 1281 2575 3865 5155 5129 3837 2559 1276
Notes: The dependent variables are the local public spending per student, the enrollment
share in public schools and the local public spending per capita, respectively. Coe¢ cients
associated with the control variables (described in the text) not reported. Public spending
per student/capita is expressed in dollars. Public enrollment is expressed in percentages. The
household mean income and its standard deviation are expressed in thousand dollars. For data
sources and summary statistics see Appendix B. Robust standard errors within parantheses. *
indicates signi￿cance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates signi￿cance at the 5 percent level, ***
indicates signi￿cance at the 1 percent level.
Part A of table 2 summarizes the e⁄ects on local public spending per student, mea-
sured in thousand dollars. Controlling for the average income, an increase in inequality
11Extended regression output is available upon request.
23lowers local spending per student in poor districts but increases it in rich districts, as
predicted by case 3 of Proposition 3. In line with the theoretical results, the mean income
has a positive e⁄ect on spending per student.
Part B of the table shows the e⁄ects on public education enrollment. Consistent with
the results on spending per student, the e⁄ects of a change in inequality vary with income
level. More unequal school districts rely more on public education only if the average
income is low enough. In these districts, even the richest households are relatively less
likely to send their children to a private school. Thus, higher inequality generates an
increase in public education enrollment in poor districts but larger private enrollments in
the rich ones, where more households opt out to begin with. The e⁄ects of a change in
mean income is also in line with the theory: negative in the poor districts and positive
in the rich ones. However, the coe¢ cients are signi￿cant only for the poor districts.
Finally, part C of the table describes the e⁄ect on the overall redistribution implied by
public education provision, measured by per capita spending. Inequality does not seem
to produce signi￿cant e⁄ects on the ￿scal burden associated with public education. The
coe¢ cients are negative for the poor districts, but only signi￿cant in the bottom 40%
sample. They are positive but insigni￿cant in the rich districts subsamples.
The e⁄ects of the tax base is positive across all subsamples but insigni￿cant in three
out of four poor district subsamples, for which the benchmark model predicts negative
e⁄ects on spending. While partially corroborating the theory, data seems to suggest
other mechanisms are at work as well. In section 4, we have presented evidence that
political participation is not independent of income at school district level. We have
then shown that including this channel in the theoretical model generated tax rates
increasing in average income (albeit lower in absolute terms compared to the benchmark)
and a monotonically negative response to inequality. This scenario is consistent with the
observed positive tax base e⁄ects at all income levels as well as with the negative and
marginally signi￿cant e⁄ect of inequality in the bottom 30% sample.
So far, the least squares estimates support the main theoretical conclusions regarding
enrollment in public schools, as well as the spending per student in these schools, but
yield less clear-cut evidence regarding the spending per capita. However, least squares
estimates are likely biased due to reverse causality stemming from endogenous sorting
across SD. To deal with this issue, we follow the approach in Boustan et al. (2010)
to construct an instrumental variable that is correlated with SD inequality but is not
directly linked to local education funding. This involves creating a synthetic income
distribution that replaces the actual frequencies across income levels in 2000 with the
corresponding 1990 shares. These are constructed by converting the endpoints of the
1990 income bins into percentiles and then projecting them onto the 2000 income scale.
Integrating the 2000 district distributions within the projected bin endpoints gives the
synthetic frequencies. This arti￿cial distribution captures the residual inequality due to
24broader trends in economic activity that have shifted the aggregate income distribution
and which individual SDs are too small to alter. The mean and standard deviation of
this synthetic distribution are used to instrument the actual 2000 income distribution
moments. Appendix C provides more details on the construction of the instrument.
There is a strong correlation between the synthetic and the actual moments: 0.96 for the
mean and 0.84 for the standard deviation.
Table 3: Inequality and redistribution: IV estimation results.
Poorest Richest
Income level 10% 20% 30% 40% 40% 30% 20% 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Public spending per student
Mean Income 89.34** 99.80*** 117.03*** 101.52*** 13.76*** 7.58 7.09 2.80
(2.04) (3.32) (4.60) (5.15) (3.26) (1.60) (1.39) (0.47)
Std. Dev. -31.79*** -23.25*** -21.90*** -23.67*** 12.17*** 18.68*** 18.95*** 21.12***
(-4.45) (-4.93) (-5.72) (-7.37) (2.90) (3.94) (3.62) (3.30)
Adj. R-Squared 0.279 0.307 0.322 0.326 0.615 0.623 0.626 0.633
(B) Enrollment in public schools
Mean Income -0.41** -0.31*** -0.36*** -0.31*** 0.02 0.03** 0.05*** 0.04*
(-2.40) (-2.90) (-4.18) (-4.90) (1.52) (2.08) (2.58) (1.83)
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.04** 0.03* 0.03** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.10***
(1.60) (2.00) (1.90) (2.21) (-4.49) (-4.29) (-4.49) (-3.85)
Adj. R-Squared 0.197 0.191 0.174 0.163 0.262 0.258 0.258 0.250
(C) Public spending per capita
Mean Income 29.98 102.51* 129.74*** 135.21*** 26.77*** 19.30*** 23.46*** 27.19***
(0.38) (1.77) (2.71) (3.81) (4.36) (2.81) (2.95) (2.63)
Std. Dev. -39.16*** -28.84*** -25.61*** -26.19*** 4.53 12.53** 7.84 1.29
(-3.47) (-3.61) (-3.99) (-4.93) (0.87) (2.09) (1.10) (0.13)
Adj. R-Squared 0.230 0.250 0.269 0.292 0.528 0.546 0.559 0.578
N 1281 2575 3865 5155 5129 3837 2559 1276
Notes: The dependent variables are the local public spending per student, the enrollment
share in public schools and the local public spending per capita, respectively. Coe¢ cients
associated with the control variables (described in the text) not reported. Public spending
per student/capita is expressed in dollars. Public enrollment is expressed in percentages. The
school district mean household income and its standard deviation are expressed in thousand
dollars. For data sources and summary statistics see Appendix B. Robust standard errors within
parantheses. * indicates signi￿cance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates signi￿cance at the 5
percent level, *** indicates signi￿cance at the 1 percent level.
Table 3 shows the instrumental variable estimates. Relative to the least squares esti-
25mates, the coe¢ cients of inequality increase in absolute value, while remaining strongly
signi￿cant in all subsamples. Computing the LM test of the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic,
we reject the weak instrument hypothesis at any customary con￿dence level.12 As before,
local spending per student (see part A) in districts at the top of the income distribution
varies positively with inequality while the opposite pattern occurs in the poor districts.
The average income has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on public spending per student
in all but top 30% districts, in line with results in Corollary 1. In part B of the table,
showing e⁄ects on public school enrollment, the coe¢ cients of the income standard devi-
ation are negative and strongly signi￿cant in rich districts while positive and signi￿cant
in all poor districts but the bottom 10%.
Regarding spending per capita, the estimates in part C of the table maintain the sign
of the least squares coe¢ cients and become strongly signi￿cant in poor districts, showing
that redistribution decreases with income dispersion at the bottom of the distribution
while it does not change signi￿cantly with inequality in the rich districts. For poor dis-
tricts, this last ￿nding is consistent with the political power model where rich households
exert a disproportionate in￿ uence on the public spending for education. In these districts,
higher dispersion in income leads to higher enrollments in public schools despite reduced
funding at local level.
While, from a strictly statistical point of view, the largely insigni￿cant link between
education funding and inequality in rich districts can be taken to provide weak evidence
supporting the results on the tax revenues, the positive signs suggest that other factors -
such as tax progressivity or di⁄erent preferences for education - might a⁄ect the behavior
of the local tax revenues. Recall, for example, that case 2 of Proposition 2 established
that for high values of ￿; the tax rate increases with inequality. If rich districts are
characterized by higher altruism toward children, beyond that captured in parental char-
acteristics included in the regression, this would induce a systematic positive response of
tax rates to inequality in these districts.
To sum up, our empirical exercises using school district data from the United States
provide strong support for opposite e⁄ects of a change in inequality at di⁄erent income
levels.
5.1 Robustness
Besides the controls described in the previous sections, we performed a number of
additional robustness tests. We used deciles of the average household income and me-
dian family income to split the sample, rather than average income per capita. As an
12We compute the test using ivreg2 command in Stata 10 and obtain values above 180. The test
statistic is distributed ￿2 with L1 ￿ k1 + 1 degrees of freedom where L1 is the number of excluded
instruments and k1 the number of endogenous regressors: For more details, see Kleibergen and Paap
(2006).
26alternative measure of public education quality, we considered instructional spending per
student instead of total local spending per student. We expanded the set of geographical
control variables to include a measure of remoteness (fringe/distant/remote), in addition
to urbanization degree and size as well as an alternative set of indicators capturing the
position of the SD relative to the closest metropolitan area. As strategic behavior of the
SDs, such as ￿scal competition, could potentially alter our results, we have also controlled
for the spending per student/capita in the SD closest in space, in terms of linear distance.
In order to test the robustness of the coe¢ cients￿signs to possible multicollinearity issues,
we have also run all the regressions alternatively excluding correlated variables, such as
the share of college graduates, average household income or the share of residents over
the age 65. A number of communities are served by overlapping SDs, dealing separately
with elementary and secondary education. To avoid any double counting biases, we also
estimated our equations excluding "secondary only" school districts. The main empirical
results survive all these exercises.
We also computed clustered standard errors at state level in order to address any
systematic bias in the response of the dependent variables beyond that captured by the
set of ￿xed e⁄ects. As an alternative estimation strategy, we created an indicator for
school districts below the median income per capita and estimated similar regressions
using the entire sample and interacting the mean and the standard deviation variables
with this indicator. In a di⁄erent approach, we introduced a linear and a quadratic
term for the mean income in addition to the interaction with the dispersion. These
regressions, which practically restrict all other slopes and intercepts to be identical across
income groups, provided similar results and were excluded due to space considerations.13
6 Conclusion
The paper investigates the role of inequality in the determination of public education
spending, using a probabilistic voting model of public education provision with a private
schooling option and endogenous fertility. We show that modelling household income
heterogeneity to be consistent with the skewness of empirical income distributions has
important consequences for the qualitative properties of the political equilibrium.
Generalizing results in the previous literature, we ￿nd a non-monotonic relationship
between inequality and per student public spending, depending on 1) the preference for
fertility relative to children quality and 2) the average per capita income (the tax base)
in the economy. For moderate fertility preferences, we show that a mean preserving
spread decreases public spending per student but increases tax rates and public school
enrollments when the average income per capita is low, while it has opposite e⁄ects in
13They are available upon request from the authors.
27richer economies. A marginal increase in the tax base, holding income dispersion constant,
also yields non-monotonic e⁄ects.
In the benchmark framework the households enjoy equal in￿ uence in local education
politics. We show that in the U.S., participation in local education politics varies with
socioeconomic indicators. We then extend the basic model to include income dependent
political power and study its properties.
Finally, the empirical analysis of U.S. school district data lends strong support to
predictions derived from the theoretical model.
While the paper focuses on the e⁄ects of inequality on education spending, investigat-
ing the dynamic e⁄ects of education in this setup, endogenizing sorting across districts
and exploring policy implications are all interesting topics for future research.
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297 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. The LHS of equation (18) is continuous and increasing
in e y; while the RHS is continuous and decreasing in e y: Moreover, lim
e y!1
LHS(e y) = 1 >
lim
e y!1
RHS(e y) = ￿=[￿(1 + ￿￿)]: Next, RHS(yl) = ￿=￿ = ￿yl=[￿(￿ ￿ 1)] > LHS(yl) = yl:
By Intermediate Value Theorem, the solution of equation (18) is interior and unique.
















































































































Next, we use (19) to rewrite @q￿=@￿ in (23):



















































From equation (22) we see that sign(@N￿=@￿) = sign(q￿￿￿(@q￿=@￿)): We use (A.10)



























Denote by !(￿;￿) = log(yl=e y￿) + ￿=(￿yl): As @￿=@￿ > 0; sign(q￿ ￿ ￿(@q￿=@￿)) =
￿sign(!(￿;￿)) =) sign(@N￿=@￿) = ￿sign(!(￿;￿)):
Next, we study the sign(!(￿;￿)): From the expression of !(￿;￿) we see that !(￿;￿) >
0 () ￿=(￿yl) > log(e y￿=yl) () e y￿ 6 b y; where b y = yle￿=(￿yl).
Using the expressions for yl and ￿ from (A.3), we can express b y as a function of the
￿rst two moments of the income distribution, ￿ and ￿:







1 + ￿2=￿2 and e is the Euler number.
In order to see if e y￿ 6 b y holds, we evaluate the LHS and RHS of equation (18) at
b y: The LHS is increasing in e y; while the RHS is decreasing in e y: Thus, the inequality














Notice that the inequality implies a restriction in ￿ and ￿: In the following, we study










































￿2 > 0: (A.15)
Consequently, h(￿) is decreasing and v(￿) is increasing in ￿ 2 (0;1): Both functions
are continuous. In addition, lim
￿!0h(￿) = ￿e=2; lim
￿!0v(￿) = 1=[1+￿￿(1￿e￿2)]; lim
￿!1h(￿) = ￿;
31and lim
￿!1v(￿) = 1=f1 + ￿￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g:
We distinguish three cases:
1) lim
￿!0v(￿) > lim
￿!0h(￿) () 1=[1+￿￿(1￿e￿2)] > ￿ exp=2 () ￿ 6 ￿ = [(2=(￿e) ￿ 1]=[￿(1￿




￿!1h(￿) () ￿ > ￿ = [(1=￿) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g;In this case h(￿) >













￿ > ￿ = [(2=(￿e)) ￿ 1]=[￿(1 ￿ e￿2)]
￿ < ￿ = [(1=￿) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g
In this case, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, the two function intersect once in
b ￿ 2 (0;1): There are two subcases here:
3.1) ￿ 2 (0;b ￿] =) h(￿) > v(￿) =) e y￿ 6 b y =) !(￿) > 0 =) @N￿=@￿ 6 0;
3.2) ￿ 2 (b ￿;1) =) h(￿) < v(￿) =) e y￿ > b y =) !(￿) < 0 =) @N￿=@￿ > 0:
Proof of Corollary 1. We use equation (A.10). As @￿=@￿ > 0; if !(￿;￿) > 0 then
@q￿=@￿ > 0: As established in Proposition 2, !(￿;￿) > 0 when ￿ > ￿ or when ￿ 2 (￿;￿)
and ￿ 2 (0;b ￿):
Consider the case when ￿ 2 (￿;￿). As the RHS of equation (A.10) contains some
other positive terms in addition to !(￿;￿) =) there exists e ￿ > b ￿ such that @q￿=@￿ > 0
on the interval ￿ 2 (0;e ￿):












































Next, we calculate @e y￿=@￿ = (@q￿=@￿)=￿￿￿; @￿=@￿ = ￿(￿2=￿3)[1 + (￿=￿)2]
￿1=2 < 0;
@yl=@￿ = (￿=￿2)(@￿=@￿) < 0: We use (A.17) in the expression of (@q￿=@￿); (24) and





































From the expression above we can see that sign(@q￿=@￿) = ￿sign(!(￿;￿)): Also,
sign(@N￿=@￿) = sign(@￿￿=@￿) = sign(!(￿;￿)):
We studied the properties of the function !(￿;￿) in the proof of Proposition 2. Thus,
there are three cases:
1) ￿ 6 ￿ = [(2=(￿e) ￿ 1]=[￿(1 ￿ e￿2] =) !(￿) < 0 =) @￿￿=@￿ < 0;@N￿=@￿ <
0;@q￿=@￿ > 0;
322) ￿ > ￿ = [(1=￿) ￿ 1]=f￿[1 ￿ (1=e)]g =) !(￿) > 0 =) @￿￿=@￿ > 0;@N￿=@￿ >
0;@q￿=@￿ < 0;
3) ￿ 2 (￿;￿). There are two subcases here:
3.1) ￿ 2 (0;b ￿] =) !(￿) > 0 =) @￿￿=@￿ > 0; @N￿=@￿ > 0; @q￿=@￿ 6 0;
3.2) ￿ 2 (b ￿;1) =) !(￿) < 0 =) @￿￿=@￿ < 0;@N￿=@￿ < 0;@q￿=@￿ > 0:






















As yl=e y < 1 and ￿ > 2; (yl=e y)
￿ ￿ 1. Since ln(1 + x) ’ x, for x ￿ 1;
ln(1 ￿ (yl=e y)
￿) ’ (yl=e y)
￿
ln(1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ (yl=e y)





Thus, (A.19) can be approximated by









where z = (yl=e y) 2 (0;1]: Denote the left and the right hand sides of (A.20) with LHS
and RHS respectively. It is easy to verify that lim
z!0LHS = +1 and lim
z!1LHS = lnyl,
lim
z!0RHS = ln(￿=(￿(1 + ￿￿))) and lim
z!1RHS = ln(￿=(￿(1 + ￿￿))) + ￿￿=(1 + ￿￿): LHS is
monotonically decreasing in z; while the RHS can be ￿rst decreasing and then increasing
in z: (i) Thus a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is
ln(￿=(￿(1 + ￿￿))) < lnyl (A.21)
If furthermore ln(￿=(￿(1 + ￿￿))) + ￿￿=(1 + ￿￿) > lnyl, the equilibrium enrollment is
interior, otherwise z = 1 => e y￿ = yl: Using the de￿nition of ￿ and (A.3) in (A.21)
and solving for ￿ results in ￿ > (ek ￿ 1)=￿; where k = ￿(ln(1=2) + ln￿) > 0: Thus, if
household￿ s concern for children is high enough, there is a unique equilibrium threshold
for private enrollment.
(ii) This su¢ cient condition that does not depend on ￿, the political power parameter.
Intuitively, as ￿ goes to zero, the problem is reduced to the benchmark, which has a
unique equilibrium. However, a more general su¢ cient condition on ￿ can be found.
Since @LHS=@z < 0; imposing @RHS=@z > 0 guarantees uniqueness. This condition can
33be further rewritten as
z




Thus, for any z < 1; one can always ￿nd a small enough ￿ to ensure uniqueness.
8 Appendix B
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Average income per capita 19625.62 7639.96 4016 105002
Average household income 51594.53 21356.33 13937.14 295694.5
Public ed. enrollment share 3499.15 15173.53 8 1075710
Public ed. spending per student 3696.03 2523.09 288.83 17900.45
Public ed. spending per capita 4185.78 2781.95 100 40028.57
Share of public ed. enrollment 91.13 6.81 32.41 100
Local revenues per student 3696.03 2523.09 289 17900
State revenues per student 4122.57 2121.8 73 108600
Federal revenues per student 504.52 688.85 0 30897
Racial diversity index 0.82 0.17 0.22 1
Share 65+ 19 5.83 0 71.96
Share with college 46.1 13.98 5.95 96.03
Share in poverty 11.65 7.39 0.08 81.43
Share non-white 12.85 16.34 0 99.01
N 12865
The school district characteristics, including all funding variables, are taken from the
Common Core of Data (CCD) survey maintained by NCES. The data on public and
private enrollment is taken from the Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2),
using the Children (CO) tabulation universe. Here a child is de￿ned as a person age 0 to
17 (as of April 1, 2000) or a person age 18 or 19 who is not a high school graduate (based
on the educational attainment response from the Census 2000 questionnaire). Household
income data and racial composition is available from the same source, using the Total
(population and households) (TT) universe. 16 income brackets are available for 2000 and
25 for 1990. The full sample contains 12865 observations. School districts are deemed
outliers if per-student local revenues are more than twice the 95th percentile, or less than
1/4 of the 5th percentile nationwide. School districts of Alaska, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia are excluded.
349 Appendix C
The following steps outline the construction of the synthetic inequality instrument:
1. For each of the 25 bins that describe the income distribution at school district (SD)
level, transform their endpoints into percentiles of the aggregate 1990 household income
distribution;
2. Obtain the dollar equivalents of each such percentiles on the aggregate 2000 house-
hold income distribution; the synthetic cuto⁄s e⁄ectively translate the 1990 density onto
the 2000 income axis;
3. Use the synthetic cuto⁄s to construct synthetic income brackets in 2000; for each
SD, attribute population mass from the actual 1990 income brackets to the corresponding
synthetic intervals on the 2000 income axis; the resulting distribution has 25 bins;
4. For each SD, using the 16 income brackets that describe the SD actual income
distribution in 2000, integrate over the relevant probability mass to obtain the synthetic
2000 income distribution with 16 bins; while having identical cuto⁄s as the actual 2000
distributions, the density of the synthetic distributions re￿ ects exclusively how the 1990
SD income distributions responded to national trends in income inequality;
5. Using the synthetic frequencies at SD level, estimate the mean and the standard
deviation of each income distribution.
The aggregate household income distributions in 1990 and 2000 are estimated based
on the respective 1% Census samples.
10 Appendix D
The ￿gures below describe the model￿ s comparative statics with and without political
power under extreme fertility preferences.
























































































































































































































(b) Mean Preserving Spread
Main education variables as a function of the mean income, keeping dispersion constant (panel
a) and Changes in main variables in response to a 10 percent increase in dispersion, at each
level of mean income (panel b) under political power (￿ = 0:3; thick line) versus benchmark
(￿ = 0, thin line). ￿ = 0:5;￿ = 2:

























































































































































































































(b) Mean Preserving Spread
Main education variables as a function of the mean income, keeping dispersion constant (panel
a) and Changes in main variables in response to a 10 percent increase in dispersion, at each
level of mean income (panel b) under political power (￿ = 0:3; thick line) versus benchmark
(￿ = 0, thin line). ￿ = 0:5;￿ = 10:
36